Last month, representatives from Japan, India, Australia, and the United States—collectively known as The Quad—met to discuss their mutual goal of ensuring maritime security in the Indo-Pacific–the area between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Quad seeks to contain expansionistic China, but the move also challenges the role of ASEAN, the established network of nations in the region.
The Quad first met in 2004 to coordinate relief efforts from the devastating tsunami. After a hiatus, they resumed their relationship to counterbalance Chinese aggression. The need for outsiders to act in the region, however, is troubling for many. The region is weary of great power struggles, having borne the brunt of many past battles; and another one appears to be brewing. ASEAN is the domestic trading bloc of nations whose members include Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Formed in 1967 to combat the rise of communism, it now focuses on mutual economic development. In 1992, it became a Free Trade Area. Today it is one the world’s largest trading blocs, with a population of 650 million and a GDP of $2.8 trillion.
ASEAN’s long-established policy of non-interference makes it hard for it to put even modest pressure on regional actors, however. In addition, China is a major trading partner, so ASEAN is ill-positioned to cry foul when China builds an island in the South China Sea and claims the surrounding territory as Chinese soil.
By the end of next year, The Quad plans to have distributed 1 billion covid vaccines throughout southeast Asia. It also has plans for joint naval exercises, disaster relief, anti-piracy efforts, and environmental initiatives. Meanwhile, ASEAN maintains centrality (neutrality) between The Quad and China, and even envisions itself as a potential powerbroker between them. However, it will first need to change its attitude to gain the power it needs to be a broker. Perhaps a little “competition” will give it a forward nudge.
Sources:
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Joanna Slater, “Meeting signals ‘Quad’ will be key to US Policy on China,” 14 Mar 2021, A2; see also https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/quad-diplomacy-counter-china/2021/03/12/9317aee8-8299-11eb-ac37-4383f7709abe_story.html
Lindsey Maizland, Eleanor Albert, “What is ASEAN?” Council on Foreign Relations, 24 Nov 2020; accessed from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-asean#:~:text=Introduction,Singapore%2C%20Thailand%2C%20and%20Vietnam.
Premesha Saha, “Caught between Giants—How will ASEAN Operationalize its Centrality in the Indo-Pacific?” Observer Research Foundation, 28 Dec 2020; accessed from https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/caught-between-giants-how-will-asean-operationalise-centrality-indo-pacific/
Masaya Kato and Ken Moriyasu, “Quad Vows to Work with ASEAN and Europe in First Biden-era Meeting,” Nikkei Asia, 19 Feb 2021.
Le Trung Kien, “The Indo-Pacific Regional Architecture: the Quad, Inclusivity and ASEAN Centrality,” AsiaLink, 23 Dec 2020.
Rifki Dermawan, “Is the Quad’s Revival a Threat to ASEAN?” The Diplomat, 18 Mar 2021.
Photo: Associated Press