Earlier this week, the Lieutenant General in charge of Afghan Special Forces wrote an Op-ed in the New York Times. He described feelings of betrayal, sadness over the loss of his country, and despair at the sacrifice of so many. He also described why he believes the war was lost, namely: the loss of American contractor logistics support, a corrupt Afghan government, and President Trump’s peace deal. Yet his comments reveal much about the broader context for the war.
The loss of contractor logistics support would undermine any fighting force. In 2006, I went to Iraq to assess Iraqi Army logistics capability. I found that the Iraqi Army was not effective at performing logistics in the way the US Army was training it. The US Army relies on nation-state techniques, such as standard operating procedures, respect for contracts, and cooperation across ethnic groups—all of which were foreign to Iraqis. A co-worker who went to Afghanistan said that they were even further removed from such things. This would explain why the Afghans could not assume responsibility for their own supply chains even after 20 years of American presence.
“So many of our leaders—including military leaders—were installed for their personal ties, not their credentials.” Corruption is endemic in nearly all societies struggling to become nation-states. Corruption is an expression of doing business the old way, when the society was a fiefdom and relationship to the king moved you ahead. This takes decades to change.
The Trump peace deal had its problems; nevertheless, it reflected a waning of US patience. The Afghan government was expected to stand-up quicker than it did. And because Americans do not like indefinite overseas commitments, the Taliban knew they simply had to wait us out.
These observations point to the conclusion I expressed last week—the same one I wrote about in 2017—that Afghanistan wasn’t ready to become a republic. A monarchy would have been a better fit. Unfortunately, until we all understand that a government has to fit the people being governed, there is likely to be more pain from leaders like LtGen Sadat.
Source:
Sami Sadat, “I Commanded Afghan Troops This Year. We Were Betrayed,” New York Times, Op Ed, 25 Aug 2021, accessed from https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/25/opinion/afghanistan-taliban-army.html
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